In this paper we consider the problem of efficiently allocating a given resource or object repeatedly over time. The agents, who may temporarily receive access to the resource, learn more about its value through its use. When the agents' beliefs about their valuations at any given time are public information, this problem reduces to the classic multi-armed bandit problem, the solution to which is obtained by determining a Gittins index for every agent. In the setting we study, agents observe their valuations privately, and the efficient dynamic resource allocation problem under asymmetric information becomes a problem of truthfully eliciting every agent's Gittins index. We introduce two "bounding mechanisms," under which agents announce types corresponding to Gittins indices either at least as high as or at most as high as their true Gittins indices. Using an announcement-contingent affine combination of the bounding mechanisms it is possible to implement the efficient dynamic allocation policy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for global Bayesian incentive compatibility, guaranteeing a truthful efficient allocation of the resource. Using essentially the same method, it is possible to approximately implement truthful mechanisms corresponding to a large variety of surplus distribution objectives the principal might have, for instance a dynamic second-price Gittins-index auction which maximizes the principal's revenue subject to implementing an efficient allocation policy.
Introduction
Multi-agent mechanism design naturally arises in a number of standard economic resource allocation problems, including auctions, multilateral trade, investments in public goods from which agents derive private benefits, and the allocation of exploitation rights for renewable resources yielding payoffs that are not publicly observed. The underlying resource allocation problem is often recurrent and the informational asymmetries are persistent in the sense that each agent's private information is updated as a consequence of both his interaction with other agents and his access to private information sources. The design of an efficient multi-agent resource allocation mechanism should therefore take into account the following two key features: (i) repeated interaction, and (ii) evolving private information. In this paper we construct an efficient Bayesian mechanism for a general instance of this problem, in which a principal repeatedly allocates an object to one of n agents who privately learn the object's value. An interesting feature of our analysis is that the efficient mechanism is obtained as an affine combination of two very simple "bounding mechanisms." Each of these bounding mechanisms provides 'one-sided incentives' resulting either in all agents' (weakly) over-reporting their types or their under-reporting their types, so that both are only imperfectly suited for the task. The particular affine combination that is realized may vary from period to period and from agent to agent, as it depends for any given agent on that agent's message to the principal. The message in turn depends on the agent's accumulated information about the object and about the other agents. Our method of combining bounding mechanisms to implement efficient allocations may also be used to approximately achieve goals other than maximizing welfare, such as the implementation of any particular type-dependent affine combination of the bounding mechanisms or (not unrelated) optimizing the principal's revenue, leading to a variety of attainable dynamic payoff profiles.
The extant literature on multi-agent mechanism design 1 focusses on the construction of mechanisms for situations in which agents interact only once or in which the agents' private information is publicly released after each round (e.g., in a perfect public equilibrium) or is perfectly recurrent in the sense that past private type realizations have no bearing upon future private type realizations (Athey and Miller, 2005) , so that the issues of learning and experimentation do not arise. Most of the available dynamic mechanisms are either for a single agent, or for a continuum of agents where only the aggregate of the other agents matters to individual agents (Courty and 1 There are a number of excellent surveys on the standard theory of mechanism design in a static setting, e.g., by Palfrey and Srivastava (1993) and Palfrey (2002) . For more recent results on certain aspects of mechanism design, see Bergemann and Välimäki (2005) on the role of information, and Martimort (2005) on the design of multilateral static contracts.
Li, 2000; Levin, 2003) . In addition to the literature on mechanism design, there are also a few results on self-enforcing equilibria in dynamic multi-agent games, such as optimal collusion with private information in a repeated game (Athey and Bagwell, 2001 ; Athey et al., 2004) ; relational contracts (Rayo, 2002; Levin, 2003) and the generic payoff attainability in a folk-theorem sense (Miller, 2004) .
In our problem of designing a mechanism for efficient dynamic allocation of an object, we admit the possibility that the agents' private information evolves over time through learning and is not necessarily disclosed after each round. Indeed, in many real-world settings the value of obtaining access to a particular resource (or of being simply involved in associated trades or contracts) is not exactly known to agents and the valuation of future transactions depends on past experience, potentially evolving over time. One may, at a given time, think of an agent's "experience" in this context as the realization of a signal correlated with the payoff obtained from using the resource the next time. For modelling simplicity we assume that the private information that an agent obtains consists of an actual reward observation, derived from using the object. Each observation strengthens the agent's beliefs about the payoffs he would likely obtain the next time he is able to obtain the object.
Many resource allocation problems lend themselves to this framework. Consider, for instance, a central research facility and several research groups that wish to use the facility. These allocations are made repeatedly for relatively short periods of time, and the effectiveness of the research groups in using these facilities is privately known only by them. Contracts to operate public facilities such as airports and to use natural resources such as forests, are renewed periodically, and have the feature that the agencies that operate the facilities or use the resources learn most about the value of the resource. Such problems also arise within a firm: the repeated allocation of an expert employee to one of several internal projects, where the employee's productivity with respect to the different tasks at hand is privately learned by the respective project managers, is another instance of the dynamic resource allocation problem discussed in this paper. A common feature of all of these problems is that the authority allocating the access rights to the critical resource in question does not actually observe the rewards obtained from its use.
This information needs to be elicited from the agents competing for the resource's allocation in each round. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) demonstrate that there does not exist any ex-ante budgetbalanced, interim incentive-compatible, and interim individually rational mechanism that achieves efficiency in a static bilateral trade setting with asymmetric information. McAfee and Reny (1992) further show that this fundamental impossibility result does not hold true when the agents' types are not independent, as deviations from full disclosure may be detected using correlation between types. Chung and Ely (2002) find that imposing ex-post incentive-compatibility and individualrationality constraints restores the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility result. The proof of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem hints at the fact that efficiency may be restored if the individual-rationality constraints can be relaxed, i.e., if agents are willing to make payments in excess of the expected gains from trade. The fundamental impossibility of efficient mechanisms can also be circumvented by introducing an independent party, the principal, who balances the budget by claiming all payments from agents and allocating the object accordingly. In our setting a principal naturally exists in the form of a central authority that allocates the object in question and evaluates the messages sent by the agents, on the basis of which allocations are made.
Our objective is to design a mechanism that guarantees the long-run (infinite-horizon) efficient repeated allocation of an object when agents privately observe sample realizations of their valuations whenever they possess the object. In a static one-period model, a simple Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973) , such as a second-price auction, leads to efficiency. In that setting it is assumed that each agent knows his own valuation precisely and only the static incentives of each agent need to be accounted for to implement efficient mechanisms. Compared to the static situation, the dynamic incentive-compatibility constraints are in some sense more stringent: while in a static mechanism it suffices to prevent deviations in which an agent pretends to be of another type, in a dynamic mechanism an agent can make his reporting strategy contingent on the information he has gleaned about his own and other's types from his past interactions.
In a finitely repeated setting, Athey and Segal (2005) construct an efficient direct revelation mechanism where truthful revelation at every stage of the allocation game is Bayesian incentive compatible. Without budget balance, this objective can easily be achieved by making each agent a fractional claimant to the total revenue generated, thus making each agent endogenize efficiency as his objective. To overcome the problem of budget balance, a re-balanced mechanism is constructed. In the Athey-Segal mechanism the last period is essentially equivalent to an d'Aspremont-Gérard-Varet-Arrow (AGV-Arrow) mechanism (Arrow, 1979; d'Aspremont et al., 1979) , and payments in earlier periods are similar to the payments in a standard VCG mechanism but computed using expected valuations over other types. Using an iterative re-balancing technique, they achieve a budget balanced mechanism. Our infinite-horizon model naturally captures (through stochastic discounting) the "going concern" in a situation where the time horizon for the repeated interactions is not known, which realistically is the case in many, if not most, interesting dynamic resource allocation problems. It is important to note that a solution to our problem cannot be obtained as the limit of finite-horizon results (backward induction is not an option) and is therefore not a straightforward extension of the finite-horizon problem. In addition, our approach of introducing bounding mechanisms, the affine combination of which may implement the efficient outcome, is entirely different and illustrates an interesting new general technique for generating incentive-compatible mechanism through systematic assembly of other mechanisms which are only one-sidedly incentive compatible. Our findings also relate directly to classic findings in the theory of sequential single-person decision making, notably the so-called multi-armed bandit problem. 2 In this problem each arm (i.e., each winning agent) of the bandit receives information about its private rewards and the gambler (i.e., the principal) observes nothing about the private rewards. In their seminal paper Gittins and Jones (1974) showed that the optimal policy has a particularly simple structure allowing the formulation of the optimal policy as an "index" policy, under which the threshold or "index" of any arm is computed independently of all other arms and the optimal choice for the gambler at each time consists in pulling (i.e., selecting) the arm with the highest index. Indeed, recent research has brought the tools of dynamic programming and mechanism design closer to the analysis of ongoing relationships with time-varying hidden information. Abreu et al. (1986) capture the incentives provided by future play in a continuation value function that maps today's outcomes into future payoffs. Fudenberg et al. (1994) prove a folk theorem for repeated games with hidden action or information. Although they focus on the case where agents cannot make monetary transfers, their framework can be extended to accommodate monetary transfers. The problem we address is closely related to the one that considered by Athey and Miller's (2005) exploration of institutional frameworks which support efficiency in an infinite-horizon repeated game with hidden valuations. The key difference between our setting and theirs is that in our setting the agents' private information evolves as a result of learning whereas in Athey and Miller's setting private information is independent from period to period and is independent of reward observations. The notion of long-run efficiency, which is achieved by the desired multi-armed bandit solution outcome, can be interpreted as the implementation of an optimal 'exploration-versusexploitation' strategy.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we outline our model, describing the way in which agents learn their valuations and interact with other agents. We also introduce our key assumptions, mainly pertaining to stochastic dominance and Bayesian regularity (requiring e.g., conjugate prior and sampling distributions), and their implications for the first-best outcome, i.e., the solution to the multi-armed bandit problem. In Section 3 we introduce the two bounding mechanisms which are 'upwards' and 'downwards' incentive compatible, respectively. These two mechanisms are the building blocks for our efficient mechanism that is constructed in Section 4 using the necessary optimality conditions for the agents' optimal revelation problem. An affine combination of the two bounding mechanisms yields a stationary and "locally" Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism. In Section 5 we verify global incentive compatibility, which obtains provided that agents are sufficiently impatient. We extend our method to settings in which the desired efficient outcome is to be achieved, at least approximately, using a prespecified 2 Thompson (1933 Thompson ( , 1935 posed the first bandit problem. He considered two Bernoulli processes and took a Bayesian point of view. The objective was to maximize the expected number of successes in the first n trials. After Thompson, the bandit problem received little attention until it was studied by Robbins (1952 Robbins ( , 1956 ), who also considered two arms and suggested a myopic selection strategy. These approaches essentially compared different strategies and looked for uniformly dominating strategies. Bradt et al. (1956) took a Bayesian approach which is the approach taken by much of the recent bandit literature.
affine combination of the bounding mechanisms. The associated results can be used to address concerns about the payoff profile that the principal (or the agents) may have, including approximate revenue maximization. Section 7 provides a number of practical applications before we summarize our findings in Section 8 and provide directions for future research.
The Model
We now introduce the basic setup of our model before formulating and interpreting the key assumptions under which our results obtain. Lastly, we specify the socially efficient first-best outcome in the form of a Gittins-index allocation policy.
Basic Setup
We consider the problem of efficiently allocating an indivisible object to one of n agents repeatedly over time. The real-valued reward R i t ∈ R ⊆ [R ,R] (with R <R) that agent i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} receives, conditional on winning the object at time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, is an element of a uniformly bounded sequence R i = {R i t } ∞ t=0 of i.i.d. random variables (a sampling process). The sampling process itself is drawn from a family Σ of distributions each with smooth density σ(·|α i ) ∈ Σ (the sampling technology), where
(with ā <ā) a compact interval, 3 and Σ = α i ∈A {σ(·|α i )} denotes the family of distributions for simplicity as the collection of sampling-process densities. Since agents do not know the value of α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ), each agent i ∈ N forms a belief about α which is updated in each period.
Conditional on his reward observations up to time t, agent i's beliefs about his own parameter α i are given by a probability density f i (·|θ i t ) over the set A. To keep the discussion simple, we assume that f i (·|θ i t ) is continuous, is conjugate with respect to the sampling technology σ, and can be indexed by a real-valued parameter θ i t ∈ Θ which summarizes the agent's private information about his observed rewards. We refer to θ i t as the type (or state) of agent i at time t and to the compact set Θ = [θ,θ] (with θ <θ) as the agents' (common) type space. Initially (at time t = 0) each agent i observes his own type θ i 0 , and his beliefs about any other agent j's type are distributed with the continuous density π j 0 (·|i). After enjoying a reward R i t at time t, agent i updates his posterior to θ i t+1 using Bayes' rule, so that 4
3 It is possible to reinterpret our findings in a discrete setting, where A is an ordered subset of a (finitedimensional) Euclidean space. Similarly, by suitably interpreting formulas in the standard Lebesgue-integration framework, the support of rewards R can be discrete. We choose a smooth structure for expositional purposes, since assumptions can be stated very clearly. 4 The prior density f i (·|θ This implicitly defines this agent's state transition function ϕ i : Θ × R → Θ, which maps the agent's current state θ i t at time t into his next state θ i t+1 at time t + 1 based on his current payoff observation R i t , i.e., θ
The stationary reward density, conditional on agent i's type, is given by
for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ N.
At any given time t, the specific sequence of events is as follows (cf. Figure 1 ). First, any agent i ∈ N enters with his prior beliefs about the rewards in the event that he wins the object at time t. His prior beliefs are summarized by his type θ i t . Based on his beliefs the agent makes an announcementθ i t = ϑ i t (θ i t ), where ϑ i t denotes his announcement-strategy at time t. Second, the principal collects the vectorθ t = (θ 1 t , . . . ,θ n t ) of all agents' announcements and allocates the object to agent k = δ t (θ t ) ∈ N . Any agent i ∈ N then pays the transfer τ i t (θ t ) to the principal. Third, agent k receives the private reward R k t . All agents subsequently update their beliefs using relation (10) below (a simple generalization of (2) for all participating agents). This three-step sequence is repeated at each time t ∈ N. 5 
Key Assumptions
To obtain natural results, it is important that any agent i's past reward observations, for which a sufficient statistic at time t is his type θ i t , induce an ordering of his actions on Θ. In other words, given a higher reward observation in the current period, the agent should ceteris paribus not expect his reward to decrease in the next period.
Assumption A1 (Reward Log-Supermodularity). The conditional reward density p i (R|θ) is log-supermodular on R × Θ for all i ∈ N . Log-supermodularity of agent i's conditional reward density p i induces the monotone-likelihood 5 An assumption that is implicit in our model is that the principal is able to commit at time t = 0 to the mechanism for all future times t > 0. ratio order, which -stronger than first-order stochastic dominance -guarantees that the conditional expectation E[R i t |θ i t ] is increasing in his type θ i t . 6 We also require that state transitions increase both in the size of the current reward observation and in the current state. Thus, the observation of a larger reward guarantees the transition (via relation (2)) to a posterior state that is not smaller than the posterior state reached otherwise.
Furthermore, given two prior states θ i t <θ i t for an agent i , his corresponding states θ i t+1 andθ i t+1 in the next period for the same reward observation satisfy θ i t ≤θ i t+1 .
Assumption A2 (State-Transition Monotonicity). The state-transition function ϕ i (θ, R)
is nondecreasing on R × Θ and all i ∈ N .
Using implicit differentiation, state-transition monotonicity is equivalent to
with
for all (R, θ) ∈ R × Θ and all i ∈ N , provided that R is a full support of the conditional reward distributions and that all parametrizations are smooth. Beyond implying monotonicity of the expected rewards and the state transitions, assumptions A1 and A2 are useful in establishing monotone comparative statics of the first-best dynamic allocation policy, detailed in Section 2.4.
The Mechanism Design Problem
A single decision maker (the "principal") has at any time t ∈ N the ability to allocate a critical resource (object) to one of n agents. To do so she uses a mechanism, which determines an allocation of the object and monetary transfers from the agents to the principal as a function of messages sent by the individual agents to the principal at the beginning of each time period.
The general design of such a mechanism involves choosing an appropriate message space and an appropriate allocation rule µ, which at each time t maps any vector of all agents' messages into a vector of transfers τ t = (τ 1 t , . . . , τ n t ) ∈ R n with payments from the different agents to the principal, and a deterministic allocation δ t ∈ N which denotes the agent who obtains the object at time t. By the revelation principle (Gibbard, 1973; Myerson, 1979) , it is possible without loss of generality to restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms, which (i) identify the message space with the type space and (ii) agents report their types truthfully. That is, at time t any agent i's messageθ i t lies in his type space Θ. Furthermore, the agents' truthfulness means that
, where u i (·) may be any nondecreasing utility function. In our setup we can think of the rewards directly in terms of utilities, without any loss in generality.
for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ N. In designing such a mechanism, the principal may have several objectives. In this paper we assume that his primary objective is to achieve an efficient allocation. Since by Lemma 1 any agent's Gittins index varies monotonically with his type, a truthful announcement allows the principal to simulate the agent's decision process and compute that agent's Gittins index. Hence, efficiency can automatically be achieved if the mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible. 7 Welfare Objective: Efficient Allocation. The principal wishes to maximize the discounted sum of rewards derived by each agent over all time periods. If we assume for simplicity (but without loss of generality) that all agents share a common discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), the principal would wish to find an (intermediate-)Pareto-efficient allocation policy δ * = (δ * 0 , δ * 1 , . . .) which solves
for all t ∈ N and allθ t ∈ Θ n , where the expectation is taken over all future reward trajectories,
given the allocation policy chosen by the principal and the agents' current message vector.
Distributional Objectives. It turns out that there may be several (or, in fact, a whole class of) mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible. Of all Bayesian incentive-compatible efficient mechanisms the principal may wish to select a revenue-maximizing mechanism, for instance. We discuss the question of how the principal may achieve this or other secondary objectives concerning the principal's distributional preferences in Section 6.
The Efficient Outcome
Let us now examine the first-best solution (efficient outcome) in the absence of informational asymmetries between the agents and the principal. If the principal could perfectly observe the rewards obtained by the agents, then an optimal solution to (6) can be obtained in the form of the celebrated "index policy." Indeed, Gittins and Jones (1974) showed that at each time t it is possible to assign to any agent i an index γ i t (θ i t ) which depends only on that agent's current state θ i t and satisfies
7 We discuss individual rationality below, cf. relation (21) in Section 6.
where the value G i (θ i t , z) is for any "retirement reward" z ∈ R determined implicitly as a solution of the Bellman equation 8
Letting π denote any stopping-time policy and T (π) the corresponding (stochastic) stopping time, we can write agent i's Gittins index at time t in the form of an annuity,
Using our assumptions in Section 2.2, the type monotonicity carries over to any agent's Gittins index, which is a measure of his future expected reward.
Lemma 1 Under assumptions A1 and A2 agent
and stationary for all i ∈ N .
It is clear from relation (7) that agent i's Gittins index in fact does not depend on the time instant t, since his reward distribution is also stationary. In what follows we therefore omit the time from the Gittins indices. The optimal policy based on the index function is simple: at any given time, compute the indices for all the agents and assign the object to the agent with the highest index. 9 In general the principal cannot observe the rewards earned by the agents, and thus never knows the state any of the agents is in. In the following sections we construct a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism that leads to the agents' truthful revelation of their private information.
Bounding Mechanisms
We now construct the most important building blocks for our truthful mechanism: two mechanisms that, while both allocating the object to the agent with the highest (indirectly) announced
Gittins index, use different transfers. In the first mechanism (A) the winning agent pays the Gittins index of the agent with the second-highest announced type, while in the second mechanism (B) the winner pays the expected reward of the agent with the second-highest announced type. 8 The classic definition of the Gittins index derives from a lump-sum retirement reward z ∈ R that makes a gambler indifferent between retiring now or continuing to play the bandit. In our context, for each agent the principal chooses between taking a retirement reward (effectively barring this agent from consideration) and continuing to allocate to this agent. 9 Tsitsiklis (1994) provides a simple and Weber (1992) an intuitive proof of optimality of the Gittins index policy.
Mechanism A. Consider the mechanism M A = (δ A , τ A ) with
and
The mechanism M A achieves "upward incentive compatibility" in the following sense.
Proposition 1
Under mechanism M A it is dominant-strategy incentive compatible for every agent i to announce a type whose corresponding Gittins index is at most as high as his true
The intuition behind the proof is as follows: if at any given time an agent were to overbid and win, when truthfulness would have led him to losing, he ends up making a loss, similar to the weak dominance of truthful revelation in a static second-price auction. To prove in this context that the agent would make a loss, it is necessary to show that for every strategy involving an exaggerated type announcement in one period, there exists a better truthful strategy. Since the agents pay in terms of Gittins indices (which themselves correspond to the retirement rewards that would make agents indifferent between participating and dropping out), we can construct strategies that dominate over-announcing. In this manner we obtain one-sided truthfulness in weakly dominated strategies for any discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). 10 Interestingly, since future transfers of an agent depend on the other agents' beliefs about their own rewards, an agent might under mechanism M A have a strict incentive to allow other agents to win. The following example illustrates this effect: while agents under M A have no incentive to overstate their Gittins indices, some agent might strictly prefer to understate his Gittins index in equilibrium. The main reason for understating one's Gittins index under M A is that it may be more beneficial for a patient agent to resolve another agent's valuation uncertainty (which might lead to lower future transfer payments) than to be forced to continuously pay high as a consequence of the other party's high announcements (driven by a lack of information paired with high expectations).
Example 1 Consider two agents, 1 and 2. We assume that agent 1's reward sequence is deterministic and constant, i.e.,
for all t ∈ N, with θ 1 0 ∈ (0, 1), where
is such that λ(ξ) = 0 for all ξ = 0 and ε −ε λ(ξ)dξ = 1 for any ε > 0. Agent 2's reward sequence is also constant, but the constant stream is unknown at time 0, so that
Given a common discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), the agents' initial Gittins indices can be computed explicitly to γ 1 (θ 1 0 ) = θ 1 0 for agent 1 and
Suppose further that at time t = 0 the agents know each others' types, while they are not known to the principal. It is clear that no agent has any incentive to announce a type higher than his Gittins index, so that ϑ i 0 (θ i 0 ) ≤ θ i 0 for i ∈ {1, 2} and mechanism M A is therefore upward incentive compatible. Consider now the case when
Since then agent 1's Gittins index is strictly larger than agent 2's (i.e., γ 1 (θ 1 0 ) > γ 2 (θ 2 0 )), he has the option to win the object by announcing his type truthfully in every period, a strategy that yields an expected net present value of (
. On the other hand, given any nonzero announcement by the second agent, agent 1 can choose to loose the object by announcingθ 1 0 <θ 2 0 , in which case with probability 1 − θ 2 0 he can obtain the object by announcingθ 1 t = ε for all t ≥ 1, where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant. Agent 1's expected net present value of this alternative strategy is θ 1 0 (1 − θ 2 0 )β/(1 − β). Since for agent 2, announcing his type truthfully is an undominated strategy, loosing the object initially is always a better strategy for agent 1, as long as
Note that β 0 < 1, since θ 1 0 θ 2 0 < 1. Thus, there is an equilibrium in which agent 1 would strictly prefer to pursue a nontruthful strategy.
The problem of underbidding disappears if the principal makes the winner pay the second-highest agent's expected rewards. This is because losing when an agent can win, does not change the expected payments when he does win (by the martingale nature of expected rewards). However, since the Gittins index is never smaller than the expected per-period reward, agents might want to deviate by overbidding.
Mechanism B. If we define a mechanism M B = (δ B , τ B ) with δ B = δ A and
Proposition 2 Under mechanism M B it is dominant-strategy incentive compatible for every agent i to announce a type whose corresponding Gittins index is at least as high as his true Gittins index, i.e.,θ i t is such that
The following example illustrates the fact that mechanism M B might not be upward incentive compatible.
Example 2 Consider the same two agents as in Example 1. Conditional on an announcement profile (θ 1 0 ,θ 2 0 ) under mechanism M B agent i ∈ {1, 2}, in case he wins the object, needs to pay the other agent's expected per-period reward E[R 
Since by Proposition 2 no agent understates his true Gittins index, agent 2 announces at least his true type θ 2 0 . On the other hand, agent 2 has no incentive to announce a higher type than θ 2 0 , since the payment of θ 1 0 in case of winning would exceed his expected per-period payoff. Given that agent 2 bids truthfully, agent 1 has an incentive to announce a typeθ 1 0 > θ 1 0 , for his actual payment of θ 2 0 under M B will be strictly less than his Gittins index.
Local Incentive Compatibility
Given the two bounding mechanisms (satisfying upward and downward incentive compatibility respectively) it is possible, under some weak additional assumptions, to construct a mechanism which satisfies necessary conditions for Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and can thus be used to obtain a local implementation of an efficient dynamic Bayesian allocation mechanism.
We assume that at the end of each period all agents' announcements are made public by the principal, just as they would be after a simultaneous-bid open-outcry auction. Under a (nonstationary) mechanism (µ t ) t∈N each agent i can update his private information about his rewards at time t only when he wins the object in that round. Agent i's state evolves, therefore, according
all other agents can be summarized by the distribution (density) vector π
for all ξ ∈ Θ and all t ≥ 0. As pointed out earlier, before bidding the very first time, at t = 0, each agent i may hold different beliefs π k 0 (·|i) about any other agent k. The belief π −i t (·) denotes the probability density that all agents other than agent i have types lower than θ. We also note that the mechanism designer always shares the beliefs of the non-winning agents, which means that her beliefs are summarized by the full vector π 1 t (·; θ 1 t−1 ), . . . , π n t (·; θ n t−1 ) for t > 0 and π k 0 (·|l = k) k∈N for t = 0, where l ∈ N \ {k} is arbitrary. We now consider the construction of a locally incentive compatible mechanism. To ensure global incentive compatibility further restrictive assumptions are needed, which we discuss in the next section. Given our nonstationary mechanism (µ t ) t∈N = (δ t , τ t ) t∈N and an announcement strategy
The key idea for obtaining Bayesian incentive compatibility is to let the principal make the parameter η i t at each time t dependent on agent i's announcementθ i t . Naturally, the parameter η i is satisfied, as long as his type θ i t is an interior point of the type space Θ. If, using the bounding mechanisms M A and M B identified in the last section, we set δ A = δ B ≡ δ and
then the system of equations (14) in η i t , η i t+1 , . . . becomes independent of time, as long as the announcement strategy profile ϑ is stationary with the possible exception of ϑ i t . In other words, given a truthful announcement policy by all agents other than agent i, agent i will find it optimal to announce his type truthfully if deviating from this strategy is not optimal in any period. 11 We therefore obtain that condition (14) 
for all θ i t ∈ Θ. The details are provided in the proof of the following result.
Proposition 3 (Local BIC) If the dynamic allocation mechanism M(η) is Bayesian incentive compatible it solves (16), so that for any θ i t ∈ Θ it is
where 
Global Incentive Compatibility
To guarantee that the mechanism implied by the results in the last section is globally incentive compatible, one needs to ensure that, in addition to relation (16), the expected future gross rewardŪ i from winning is supermodular. It turns out that global BIC can indeed be 11 This corresponds to the well-known one-stage deviation principle for infinite-horizon games (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 110). Its application is justified, since the game is 'continuous at infinity' as a result of the uniform boundedness of all agents' per-period payoffs.
established in this manner, provided that agents are sufficiently impatient, i.e., their common discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) is small enough, and their conditional reward densities are parameterized 'strongly' in a sense that is made precise below. As a consequence of the reward logsupermodularity guaranteed by Assumption A1, the expected per-period reward, conditional on winning, is monotonically increasing in an agent's type. That is,
is increasing in θ i t , given any possible announcementθ i t ∈ Θ and beliefs π −i t . Let us denote agent i's optimal expected utility (or "value function") bȳ
The next lemma shows that under the reward monotonicity and state transition monotonicity assumptions we made in Section 2, the value function is monotonic in agent i's type. 12 Lemma 2 Under assumptions A1 and A2 any agent i's value functionŪ i (θ i t ; π 
The proof of the foregoing result is constructive in the sense that a Lipschitz constant K can can be obtained explicitly as a function of model primitives. If the agent won the object in the last round, Lemma 3 may not hold true, since, given truthful announcement-strategies by the other agents, agent i knows their types precisely, rendering his payoff as a function of his announcement possible discontinuous, i.e., not Lipschitz. 13 The two properties established by Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 help us establish the supermodularity of agent i's value function for sufficiently impatient agents. In addition, the parametrization of the agent's conditional expected 12 The value-function monotonicity is not immediately implied by the reward monotonicity and Gittins-index monotonicity, as it includes the (expected) transfer payments in the current and all future periods. 13 Suppose that agent j = i wins the object at time t − 1, then π j t is a continuous function. It is the boundedness of π j t that is critical for establishing the Lipschitz property of U i .
per-period reward E[R i t |θ] needs to be strong in the sense that there exists a constant ρ > 0, such that θ,θ ∈ Θ and θ >θ ⇒ E[R
for any i ∈ N .
Proposition 4 (Global BIC) Suppose that relation (20) holds for any agent i ∈ N . Under assumptions A1 and A2 there exists a β 0 > 0 such that for all β ∈ (0, β 0 ) the mechanism M(η) satisfies global BIC, i.e., agent i always (weakly) prefers telling the truth:
for any θ,θ ∈ Θ and beliefs π −i t .
As long as agents are sufficiently impatient, the last result guarantees global Bayesian incentive compatibility of the mechanism M(η), which thus efficiently allocates an indivisible object in each period t ∈ N.
We construct an example to show that although very patient agents might choose to lie about their types, sufficiently impatient agents would choose to play truthfully.
Example 3 Consider the case of two agents and a single object allocated repeatedly between the two agents. Agent 1 knows his valuation for the object, v 1 to be $1 with certainty. Agent 2, however, is not certain and thinks that there is a 1/3 chance that his valuation could be $1.
It could however, also turn out to be $0 with probability 2/3. He would find out which is the case only after being allocated the object once. Agent 1's Gittins index is γ 1 = 1. If at time period t = 1 agent 2 observes a zero reward, his optimal stopping time would be τ = 1, while if he observes a reward of 1, it would be τ = ∞. The Gittins index for agent 2 at time 0, γ j , can be computed using the equation
This gives us γ j = 1/(3 − 2β) and an expected reward of 1/3. We consider the mechanism M(η)
parameterized by an announcement dependent parameter η(θ) and show that for very patient agents (β = 1 − ε for some ε > 0 close to zero), truthtelling cannot necessarily be induced: for agent 1, to announce his Gittins index truthfully at time 0 would imply a win. If this were the optimal strategy, then it would imply truthtelling in every subsequent time period (since agent 1 learns no new information about the object's value) and would give agent 1 a total reward of
If, however, agent 1 decided to announce a very low Gittins index at time 0 (say, zero), to ensure that agent 2 wins, and realized his true type, then if agent 2 turned out to have a zero valuation, agent 1 would pay zero from time 1 onwards. This strategy would earn agent 1 an expected payoff of 2β 3(1−β) . Provided that η ≤ 1 (cf. the individual-rationality constraint (21) below), for agent 1 to announce his true type, it must be the case that
which is satisfied, as long as β ≤ β 0 = 3/4.
Implementation of Distributional Objectives
We have shown in Sections 4 and 5 that, under certain conditions, the mechanism designer can implement the first-best outcome with a Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism M(η), which is a type-contingent affine combination of the bounding mechanisms M A and M B . Based on the vector of truthful type announcements, implementing the efficient outcome determines in each round the agent who obtains the object (the one with the highest Gittins index). Note that therefore δ A = δ B = δ, so that the function η = (η 1 , . . . , η n ) solely affects the transfers between the agents and the principal. Furthermore, local BIC determines η only up to a constant, so that an adjustment of the revenue distribution between principal and agents may be possible via appropriate shifts, provided that the global BIC properties remain unaffected. Letη = (η 1 , . . . ,η n ) : Θ n → R n + be an absolutely continuous function and let δ : Θ n → N with δ(θ) ∈ arg max i∈N γ i (θ i ) for any θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) ∈ Θ n be the welfare-maximizing first-best allocation function. In a complete information setting, provided that agents participate, the ex-ante payoff to the principal is
where the smooth utility function V : R n → R captures the principal's discounting, risk, and fairness preferences when evaluating the transfers τ i (·;η i ) =η i τ i A (·) − τ i B (·) + τ i B (·) pointwise, and H : Θ n → [0, 1] is a cumulative distribution function representing her prior beliefs about the agents' types (identical to the agents' prior beliefs in our common-knowledge setting). The precise form of the principal's payoff functionalΠ is unimportant. The only feature necessary for our results is thatΠ(η) is a continuous operator. 14 Rather than solving the principal's payoff maximization problem subject to the agent's participation, we assume that a solutionη has already been found. For instance, if the principal is strictly revenue-maximizing, in which case her utility becomes V = v n i=1 τ i (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ;η i (θ i )) (with v a smooth increasing function), thenη i = 1 for all i ∈ N corresponding to a 'dynamic second-price Gittins-index auction.' The following result establishes that, whatever the (sufficiently smooth) solutionη might be under complete information, the principal can come arbitrarily close in 14 We say that the operatorΠ is continuous if for any ε > 0 there exists a constant d = d(ε) > 0 such that If for a given ε > 0 the mechanism M(η) is globally BIC, then the principal has met her revenue-distribution objective up to an epsilon while at the same time implementing the firstbest outcome. It is important to note that in order to ensure agent i's participation, the principal, when optimizing her revenue objectives, needs to satisfy the constraint
as long as agent i's presence yields to a net increase in the expected payoff.
Application: Probationary Contracts
In this section we provide a concrete example as an illustration for our methods. Although the Gittins index can be solved for numerically, analytical expressions are often difficult to obtain 15 .
15 Katehakis and Veinott (1987) have shown that the Gittins index for a bandit in state θ may be interpreted as a particular component of the maximum-value function associated with the 'restart in θ' process, a simple Markov Decision Process to which standard solution methods for computing optimal policies (e.g., successive
Therefore, we assume a simple stochastic reward structure where agents can get realizations from one of several deterministic reward sequences, but initially do not know which one. We note that versions of this example have appeared in the literature (cf. footnote 16), without concern for the issues raised by asymmetric information and mechanism design.
Many bilateral relationships in real life are probationary in the sense that two parties evaluate each other for a limited 'courtship period' before they decide about exercising the option of recontracting more permanently by entering into a long-term contract (Sadanand et al., 1989) .
Large manufacturing firms often use parallel sourcing (Richardson, 1993 ) before committing to a single supplier, for the multiple relationship-specific investments may be too costly compared to the expected benefit of keeping the suppliers in competition with each other. In real-estate transactions there is typically an 'in-escrow' period between the initial agreement and the closing of the deal, when either party performs its due diligence and may renege at a specified penalty cost. Similar due-diligence periods exists for acquisitions and mergers of corporations. Lastly, a couples' personal engagement, perhaps fortunately, does not always result in a marriage. There is no shortage of examples.
We elaborate on a setting where a firm may keep candidates on probation for a while before deciding to extend an offer of regular employment. 16 Consider an employer faced with two candidates for employment. Each candidate i ∈ {1, 2} is either productive (α i ≥ 0) or unproductive (α i < 0), but his suitability for the job can be evaluated only on the job. Given the job for a trial period t, candidate i has a probability θ i t ∈ [0, 1] = Θ of learning his productivity α i ∈ [−1, 1] = A, in which case he would be able to produce a stream of stochastic rewards R i t , with an expected per-period payoff proportional to his productivity. More specifically, given α i candidate i's per-period rewards are distributed with probability density Weitzman referred to as the reservation wage for a job, the agent's optimal policy being to accept the job offering the highest reservation wage. Weitzman's model, however, did not allow workers to learn: everything that needed to be learned was done as soon as the box was opened (job offer accepted). Adam (2001) extended Weitzman's model to allow for the agents to learn more about the job as they perform it. In that setting learning is allowed to occur in a Bayesian, non-parametric or ad-hoc fashion. Gittins (1989) also draws on labor market examples to motivate the multi-armed-bandit problem. Similarly, Lippman and McCall (1981) and Morgan (1985) deal with the problem of optimal search strategies from a worker's point of view: analyzing the decision of whether to accept a job offer or to search for a new one.
where R i t ∈ {a, 0, b} ⊂ R = [a, b] with a < 0 < −a < b. At time t = 0, each candidate i privately observes the parameter θ i 0 ∈ Θ. Conditionally on his information (θ i t , ω i t ) at any time t ∈ N , his beliefs about his productivity α i are distributed with the probability density
where ω i t ∈ {0, 1/2, 1} = Ω is a second, possibly public, component of candidate i's type. The second component is necessary to ensure that f i is indeed conjugate to the sampling technology σ. Initially ω i 0 = 1/2 for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Given the simple stochastic structure of our model, the state-transition function for both candidates is
for all (θ, ω) ∈ Θ × Ω and all R ∈ R. Given the principal's mechanism M(η), candidate i's posterior information (θ i t+1 , ω i t+1 ) can be computed using (10),
whereθ i t ∈ Θ corresponds to agent i's announcement at time t. Note that candidate i's productivity becomes apparent on the N i -th day, where N i is a geometrically distributed Bernoulli random variable with parameter θ i 0 . At the end of any given time period t, the agent who wins the job contract in that period can have three possible realizations: he can (i) realize that his reward in every subsequent period will be a < 0, (ii) realize that his reward in every subsequent period will be b > 0, or (iii) not realize any new information about his productivity by observing a zero per-period reward. For simplicity, we assume that each candidate has a reservation utility of zero and would therefore quit in case (i). Let us now compute candidate i's Gittins index at any time t, when he has not yet realized his final reward stream (i.e., when ω i t = 1/2). The utility of that reward stream net of a retirement reward γ at the optimal stopping policy is u i 0 (θ i 0 ; γ), whereas given an optimal stopping policy it is u i a (γ) = a − γ if he realizes reward stream a and u i b (γ) = (b − γ)/(1 − β) if he realizes reward stream b. Thus,
Setting the right-hand side of the last relation to zero thus yields candidate i's Gittins index, provided he is still in the uncertain state, i.e., ω i t = 1/2. In sum, we thus obtain
At time t, let us examine the case where the uncertainty for both agents is still unresolved, i.e., for any agent i it is θ i t ∈ (0, 1) and ω i t = ω = 1/2. In that case, agent i's utility can be written implicitly,
in terms of agent i's value function evaluated at the possible outcome states in the next period (i.e., at time t + 1). To derive an explicit expression we first consider the two terms on the right-hand side of (22) that are not directly related to current-period transfers, namely expected current-period rewards in case of winning and expected value in case of winning (in which case the other agent's type will be perfectly known at time t + 1). Agent i's expected current-period rewards in case of winning are given by
while his expected value in case of winning evaluates to
As pointed out earlier, in the case of winning at time t agent i knows agent j's type θ j t+1 = θ j t perfectly well at time t + 1. We thus examine separately the two possibilities of agent i's type θ either exceeding θ j t or not (the case of equality being in expectation ex ante irrelevant, since it occurs with probability zero). For θ > θ j t , agent i's value function in case of winning becomes
In case of loosing, his expected value is
If, on the other hand, θ < θ j t , then he obtains
.
If we set
then by substituting equations (23)- (27) in equation (22) and subsequently integrating with respect to beliefs that are, for computational simplicity, uniformly distributed (i.e., π j t (θ j t ; θ j t−1 ) ≡ 1) we obtain agent i's expected utility in the additively separable form (13), i.e.,
We are now ready to explicitly construct the announcement-dependent affine combination in our efficient dynamic mechanism (using Proposition 3) and then verify global BIC (using Proposition 4), computing an explicit upper bound β 0 for the discount rate. We then turn to the principal's approximate revenue maximization subject to efficiency (using Proposition 5). 
for all θ ∈ [0, 1], where g(θ)
The right-hand side, h(θ), of the linear ODE (28) depends on the value of its solution at θ = 1.
Thus, by prescribing this value as 'initial condition,' we obtain a well-defined initial-value problem which can be solved using either formula (17) in Proposition 3 or direct application of the variation-of-constants formula (Petrovski, 1966, p. 20) . A number of solution trajectories η i (θ), θ ∈ [0, 1] of (28) corresponding to different initial values η i (1) are depicted in Figure 3 for (a, b) = (−1, 2) and ω i t = 1/2.
Global Incentive Compatibility. To verify that the reward parametrization is strong according to (20) , which is by Proposition 4 sufficient for global incentive compatibility (provided the discount rate β is small enough), we note that
Following the argument of the proof of Lemma 3, notice that
The first inequality in the last relation stems from our assumption that all agents are free to participate in the principal's mechanism. As a result, for anyθ,θ, θ ∈ Θ:
To establish the Lipschitz property of U i , notice first that
where
}, suppressing the dependence on time t. On the other hand, for anyθ, θ,θ ∈ Θ it is
We have therefore shown that |U i (θ, θ; π
. Thus, as long as
Proposition 4 guarantees global incentive compatibility.
Approximate Revenue Maximization Subject to Efficiency. Using the η i computed above to construct an incentive-compatible affine combination of the bounding mechanisms, the firm can guarantee efficient experimentation and truthful announcements of an agent's private information about his productivity. For a profit-maximizing firm, however, the distributional constraints for the principal would imply choosingη i ≤ 1 such that
for allθ ∈ Θ. By Proposition 5 the optimalη i (provided sufficient regularity) can be approximated by a piecewise absolutely continuous functionη i that satisfies the equation (28) a.e. on a partition of Θ.
Remark. A special case of this probationary contracts model discussed above is when the uncertainty about an agent's deterministic reward stream is resolved as soon as he obtains the resource once. Then the solution to equation (28) becomes the trivial solution η(θ) ≡ 0. In this situation the mechanism M B with transfers τ B corresponding to the second-highest one-period expected rewards guarantees truthfulness.
Discussion
The literature on solving dynamic and stochastic optimization (or dynamic and stochastic scheduling) problems has evolved tremendously over the last 50 years and a large number of decision problems have successfully been addressed using the models and algorithms developed therein. These, however, have only now begun to be applied to multi-agent systems, where the agents' objectives need not be aligned with a social planner's objectives. In this paper, we construct an efficient dynamic mechanism where agents learn their valuations privately. We find two bounding mechanisms based on the multi-armed bandit problem which satisfy one-sided Bayesian incentive-compatibility conditions. A type-dependent affine combination of these two mechanisms leads to local Bayesian incentive compatibility." We show that if agents are sufficiently impatient, global Bayesian incentive compatibility of the mechanism can be guaranteed.
In addition, the principal may be able to achieve separate distributional objectives (e.g., maximizing his own revenues or achieving some fairness goal), reallocating surplus between him and the agents. We show that local Bayesian incentive compatibility can almost everywhere be preserved while at the same time it is possible to approximate the principal's payoff corresponding to any (not necessarily Bayesian incentive compatible) affine combination of the bounding mechanisms arbitrarily closely.
The multi-armed bandit problem has been studied extensively and has thus become a useful framework for to address questions involving dynamic decision making in the presence of uncertainty and learning. Albeit often computationally intense (cf. footnote 15), the multi-armed bandit framework has been applied in many diverse settings, ranging from machine scheduling in manufacturing (Gittins, 1989; Walrand, 1988; Van Oyen et al., 1992) , job search in labor markets (Mortensen, 1986 ), search problems in oil exploration, target tracking (Gittins, 1989; DeGroot, 1970) , resource allocation problems in communication networks (Ishikida, 1992) , and industrial research under budget constraints (Gittins, 1989) to clinical trials (Katehakis and Derman, 1986) .
In this paper, we have used but the base vanilla flavor of the bandit problem where a fixed number of bandits earn independent rewards, time is in discrete periods, at most one bandit is experimented with at any time, only the bandit that is operated is allowed to change its state, there is no cost associated with switching between bandits, there are no budgets (or minimum reserves), and rewards evolve in a Markovian fashion. Each one of these constraints has been relaxed by researchers, which gives access to a large variety of results on a rich class of bandit problems. As an example, the problem where bandits may change states even when they are not being experimented with, known as the 'restless bandit problem,' was first studied by Whittle (1988) . This last framework is popularly chosen when information about one bandit's reward rates influences the beliefs about others. This is the case when reward rates are correlated.
When the number of agents is not fixed, but follows a birth-and-death process which depends on the bandit selected to operate, the problem is known as the 'branching bandit problem' and was first introduced by Meilijson and Weiss (1977) . When rewards are non-Markovian, the problem can no longer be modeled as a classical Markov Decision Process. Mandelbaum (1986) has studied the case of rewards modelled as multi-parameter processes such as diffusion processes. which have been studied in the literature.
As we have seen through the mechanisms derived in this paper, indexability is a crucial property of dynamic and stochastic optimization problems to design mechanisms which lead to optimal allocation of resources in multi-agent asymmetric information games. By an indexable bandit problem, we mean a bandit problem whose optimal solution is given by an index policy, i.e., at any stage the optimal policy is given by a comparison of indices computed for each bandit. A decomposable index policy is where a bandit's index does not depend on any of the other bandits.
As we have seen, the vanilla flavored problem can be solved using a decomposable Gittins index policy. A lot of the work done in trying to solve the various extensions of the bandit problem has tried to identify whether the optimal scheduling policy is an index policy. Not all of the the above extensions can be characterized by an index policy, let alone a decomposable one. Bertsimas and
Niño Mora (1996) use a polyhedral approach to derive a general theory to characterize which bandit problems are indeed indexable. Extending the approach outlined in this paper to other indexable problems would be a valuable next step. 
Appendix: Proofs
is strictly decreasing on (m, M ). As a result,
for all θ ∈ (m, M ). We first show that G i (·, z) is differentiable on (m, M ). Indeed, the last relation implies that
for all θ ∈ (m, M ). But this provides the desired contradiction and we have therefore shown that the function G i (·, z) is increasing for any given retirement reward z ∈ R. Given the monotonicity of G i (·, z), agent i's Gittins index must be monotonically increasing. To see this, considerθ,θ ∈ Θ withθ <θ. By definition, the Gittins index is the smallest retirement reward z, for which function G i (·, z) = z. Since by monotonicity G i (θ, z) lies above G i (θ, z) for every z, the smallest z such that G i (θ, z) = z exceed the corresponding value for G i (θ, z). The stationarity of the Gittins index obtains, since by relation (9) it does not depend on the time instant t. This concludes our proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. We focus on a setting with two agents, as our arguments generalize to N agents in a straightforward manner. Agent i ∈ {1, 2} is of type θ i t and let j = 3 − i. We show that at time t this agent announces a distribution parameterθ i t which corresponds to a Gittins index not larger than his true Gittins index, i.e., γ i (θ i t ) ≤ γ i (θ i t ). Let ϑ i = ϑ i t (·) t∈N denote agent i's announcement strategy under which he overstates his Gittins index at time t.
The interesting case occurs when his time-t announcementθ i t = ϑ i t (θ i t ) is such that
i.e., when agent i wins the object, even though truthful revelation would have caused him to lose.
For any stopping timeT i ≥ 0 we have, for all θ j t satisfying relation (29) , by the definition (9) of the Gittins index that
where T i would be the optimal stopping time if agent i had paid γ i (θ i t ) from time t onwards. losing the object at time t +T i + 1 implies that
where agent j's announcement isθ
. We now construct an alternate strategyθ i = (θ i t (·;T i )) t∈N for agent i, which is strictly better for him than ϑ i . Without loss of generality, the two strategies coincide in the periods 0, . . . , t − 1. At time t, agent i announcesθ i t =θ i t (θ i t ;T i ), corresponding to the future value of his Gittins index under the previous strategy (and thusT i ), such that
This would result in agent j's winning the object from time t until time t +T j for some appropriate stopping timeT j . In that case agent j's type at the beginning of period t +T j + 1 is the same as the state he would have finished in at time t + T j + 1 if agent i had announcedθ i t at time t. At time t +T i +T j + 2, announcing the true Gittins index γ i (θ i t ) would result in agent i winning the object from time t +T i +T j + 2 onwards, while paying only
For our argument we now fix the reward sample paths R 1 and R 2 . We assume that the reward of agent k ∈ {1, 2} after winning w times is r k w , where r k w = R k t if this event occurs at time t. In other words, we assume that independently of the particular time when agent k wins the object for the w-th time, the reward he obtains corresponds to the w-th element of the path {r k 1 , r k 2 , . . .}. 17 Assuming that agent i has won the item w(i) times before time t, we note (given the fixed sample paths) that at all outcomes r i w(i) , ..., r i w(i)+T i +1
, for which agent i paid γ j (θ j t ) under ϑ i , he pays γ j < γ j (θ j t ) underθ i , and the game from t +T i + 1 onwards is the same as that under the strategy ϑ i . It follows that strategyθ i is strictly better for agent i than strategy ϑ i , which concludes our proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. We consider the case of two agents, i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3 − i. The arguments in the proof extend to more than two agents. Let γ i (θ i t ) > γ j (θ j t ). We show that at any time t ∈ N agent i announces a distribution parameterθ i t corresponding to a Gittins index at least as large as his true Gittins, i.e., γ i (θ i t ) ≥ γ i (θ i t ). Let ϑ i = (ϑ i t (·)) t∈N denote agent i's announcement strategy. Suppose that at a given instant t the agents' optimal stopping times are T i and T j , conditionally on paying their respective Gittins indices in every period. From the definition (9) of the Gittins index we obtain that
The inequality results from the fact that T j is the optimal stopping time for agent j. Indeed, for any other stopping time T i , if the inequality were reversed, then γ j (θ j t ) could be increased and a supporting policy resulting in T i could be used. The foregoing relations imply that If we letT i denote the first time for which γ i (θ iT i ) < γ j (θ j t ), then necessarily T i <T i . This is because by hypothesis γ i (θ i t ) > γ j (θ j t ), and T i can be described as the first time after which agent i's discounted net payoff crosses γ i (θ i t ) from above. Agent i's expected reward until timeT i can be expressed recursively in the form Since γ i (θ i t ) > γ j (θ j t ), the first term on the right-hand side is nonnegative, that is, until time T i agent i obtains a nonnegative payoff (i.e., until he down-crosses γ i (θ i t ) but is still above γ j (θ j t )). The continuation payoff can again be written recursively as the sum of a nonnegative term and a continuation payoff. Since all the terms are nonnegative, this results in Thus, we see that the expected payoff up to timeT i from winning an object by bidding honestly is non negative for agent i. Consider any alternate strategyθ i t (·) where an agent deviates by announcing a type lower than his true type bidding his true value. The interesting case would be when he loses as a result, when announcing the true type would have resulted in a win. That is,
This deviation would result in agent j winning the object for T j periods. Then the expected payment that agent i makes when he wins the object at time t + T j + 1 is the same as the expected payment that he would make had he won at time t. This is because for any θ where P denotes the probability that at time s agent i hits state θ i s , and the other agents hit state θ −i s , given that agent i announcesθ i t at time t and makes truthful future announcements.
Since the per-period rewards R i t are i.i.d. by assumption, agent i's expected utility does not explicitly depend on time, provided that the coefficients η i t are stationary. Furthermore, when differentiating the right-hand side of the last relation with respect to agent i's announcementθ i t only the time derivativeη i t appears. More specifically, we obtain agent i's necessary optimality conditions for truthtelling in the form type agent i's expected utility is strictly decreasing, then a forteriori it is also strictly decreasing from some particular realizations of the other agent's type. To obtain a contradiction to the claim thatŪ i (·; π j t ) is strictly decreasing somewhere on Θ, it is therefore sufficient to examine the case when agent i has won the object at time t − 1 and he consequently knows agent j's type (for the principal, by assumption, makes all type announcements public after every round).
After winning a round, agent i will, as a function of his type announcementθ, know exactly whether he wins the object or not. If his optimal announcementθ i t is such that he wins the object at time t, then U i (θ; λ θ ) is the most negative. In addition, we choose the type θ j t in the compact set Θ such that K i < 0 represents the smallest slope ofŪ i . Given that type (which we can omit in the notation), it isŪ
where κ = τ i (θ j t−1 ; η i (θ i t )) is an appropriate constant. As a consequence of assumptions A1 and A2 we can show, using a technique exactly as in the proof of Lemma 1 (used there to establish the monotonicity of G i ), thatŪ i (θ) cannot be decreasing. On the other hand, if agent i's optimal announcementθ i t is such that he does not win the object at time t, then agent i's perperiod reward is zero andŪ i can be expressed in the form of (31) with π j t replaced by π j t+1 . By recursion, we see that the monotonicity of the stationaryŪ i can be influenced only by the per-period rewards in winning rounds, the utility for which is nondecreasing in type as a consequence of Assumption A1. Hence, the functionŪ i (·; π j t ) is increasing, which concludes our proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. For simplicity we consider a situation with two agents, i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3 − i. The generalization of our arguments to the general case of n > 2 agents is straightforward.
The proof proceeds in three steps.
Step 1: the function p i (R|θ) is Lipschitz in θ for any R ∈ R. From (3) we know that the stationary reward density, conditional on agent i's type, is given by
for all (R, θ) ∈ R × Θ. Hence, for any R ∈ R and any θ,θ ∈ Θ we have that
where (with f i 2 (α|θ) = ∂f i (α|θ)/∂θ) 
